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Abstract: Foster care in the UK, especially England, has developed a broad base 
of service delivery. No longer an almost exclusively public sector activity, foster 
placements and related therapeutic and educational services are increasingly located 
in the non-governmental sector and delivered by independent fostering providers 
(IFPs). As this sector has grown, so too have contracting arrangements between IFPs 
and local authority purchasers, most of whom have faced considerable diffi culties 
in recruiting and retaining suffi cient numbers of foster carers for their looked after 
children. With the strengthening policy shift towards commissioning, different 
contracting models are emerging. These are described with reference both to recent 
studies and a broader critique of relevant legal, policy, ideological and managerial 
developments in order to speculate about the future of a mixed economy of foster 
care.
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Foster care in the UK, and especially in England, is no longer a public sector activity 
supplemented only by voluntary child care organizations. Somewhere in the region 
of twenty per cent of all looked after children are placed with foster carers attached to 
a range of non governmental fostering agencies (DfES, 2005a). Known collectively as 
independent fostering providers (IFPs), these organisations assess, approve, train and 
supervise foster carers and provide, for payment, foster placements and therapeutic 
and educational services to local authorities for children and young people in their 
care or accommodation (Sellick, 2005, p.2). A national survey of IFPs in 2001 
(Sellick and Connolly, 2001, 2002) and a review of fostering practice across the UK 
for the Social Care Institute for Excellence in 2003 (Sellick and Howell, 2003, 2004) 
illustrated the signifi cant growth of these agencies in both the traditional voluntary 
child care sector and the rapidly expanding private sector.
The expansion in the use of IFP placements can be attributed to two main 
factors. Firstly, as fostering has become the principal placement of choice, most 
local authorities across the UK have experienced a chronic shortage of foster 
carers (Waterhouse, 1997; Triseliotis et al, 2000; Swain, 2005). Secondly, since the 
beginning of the New Labour government in 1997, policy has shifted incrementally 
towards commissioning services for children, including fostering, from outside the 
public sector (Sellick and Connolly, 2002).
The green light to IFP usage had already been given sometime before the change of 
government. Social Services Inspectors had reported in 1995, for example, that these 
agencies ‘represent a new and expanding source of foster placements’ (Department 
of Health, 1995, p.14). However, a much stronger steer came from the Secretary of 
State in 2001 who said that ‘For too long, in my view, there has been a stand off in 
the relationship between the statutory, private and voluntary care sectors. There 
should be no ideological barriers getting in the way of the best care for vulnerable 
people’ (Department of Health, 2001). Whilst launching the new Choice Protects 
initiative in the following year, the Minister of Health spoke of the importance, of 
‘helping councils commission and deliver effective placements and the contribution 
of the independent fostering agencies’ (Department of Health, 2002b). Little 
wonder perhaps that the independent fostering sector expanded rapidly during this 
period from 62 agencies in 1998 to 265 in 2005 (Sellick, 2006b). The Green Paper 
(Department for Education and Skills, 2006) has cemented these steps: it includes 
proposals for piloting new regional commissioning units of services building upon 
existing arrangements.
The diffi culties faced by many local authorities in fi nding an adequate supply 
of foster carers led most to purchase IFP placements, often at short notice and 
in emergencies, on what has been called a ‘spot-purchased basis’ (Sellick, 1999, 
Kirton et al, 2003, Sellick and Howell, 2004). This method of commissioning has 
three major defi cits. Firstly, it does not allow IFPs to predict likely demand or local 
authorities to predict cost. Secondly, it effectively prohibits both the local authority 
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commissioners and the independent providers from planning for their respective 
needs and services. Thirdly, it takes little account of the individual needs of children 
or the particular strengths of their prospective foster carers. As Petrie and Wilson 
found in their study of children’s day care and fostering services ‘the use of spot 
purchasing as a major distributive mechanism merely refl ects the fact that children 
are slotted in wherever there is a vacancy with little opportunity for matching or 
choice’ (Petrie and Wilson, 1999, p.194).
Another approach for commissioning fostering services is known as ‘outsourcing’ 
where public authorities transfer responsibility for all or most of their provision to 
non governmental agencies. Although largely absent in the United Kingdom (UK), 
this approach has been tried and tested in parts of the United States of America and 
Australia (Barber, 2002, Unruh and Hodgkin, 2004). Researchers in both countries 
found two main problems - it encourages the establishment of a few, large agencies 
which successfully manipulate and monopolise the market and, related to this, the 
range and diversity of services are reduced.
A third approach (and in the New Labour lexicon, a ‘middle-way’) has emerged 
whereby local authorities and IFPs have entered into contracting or service level 
arrangements with one another. These arrangements allow them to minimise the 
risks of both spot purchasing and outsourcing by planning for the purchase and 
provision of an agreed range, set and number of services. In his study of these 
emerging agreements, Sellick proposed a commissioning framework which would 
avoid the combined pitfalls of the other two approaches. He stated:
The establishment of small networks of local authorities and IFPs was commonly 
seen as the most effective framework for commissioning from the respondents in this 
study. Although mostly regional, these networks might include some more distant 
IFPs where local authorities required long-term or very specialist placements. Such 
networks of agencies allow local authorities and IFPs to contract with two or three 
partner agencies. This would go some way to avoiding the risks of monopolies identifi ed 
in the American and Australian studies. Within each network, commissioned services 
would be identifi ed and planned and include the full range of fostering placements 
according to local need (Sellick, 2005, p.12).
.
The major question, which the rest of this paper examines, is whether this 
framework has a chance to succeed or whether other, ever-strengthening, forces 
driving policy and practice will shape a quite different commissioning model. 
Previous studies, particularly over the past decade, have charted the factors which 
underpinned the emergence and establishment of IFPs. This paper refl ects upon 
these studies, but also considers contemporary pragmatic, ideological, managerial 
and political forces in order to speculate about the nature and location of future 
fostering service provision in Britain.
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Supplementing or exploiting shortfalls in public provision?
Successive publications have charted the increasing proportion of children and 
young people who were fostered and the correspondingly decreasing proportion 
that were placed in residential or other non-family based care (Sellick et al, 2004, 
Wilson et al, 2004, Sellick, 2006a). As this practice progressed, fl aws in the system 
began to appear with accounts of placement instability and lack of placement choice 
for matching children’s needs with foster carers’ skills. A kind of structural fault 
seemed to have appeared in which the virtual absence of placement alternatives 
to foster care had led to a chronic shortage of foster carers across most of the UK. 
As fostering became the principal placement of choice, and despite foster carer 
shortages, there was an inevitable steer towards using mainstream foster carers for 
ever larger numbers of young people with signifi cant emotional diffi culties. These 
young people often demonstrated behaviour that required a range of responsive, 
therapeutic and educational services in addition to stable foster care placements. 
The independent fostering agencies were quick to recognize and act upon this and 
offer the kind of provision identifi ed in an early evaluation of one of the fi rst IFPs 
(Sellick, 1999, Sellick and Connolly, 1999).
Another aspect of this monopoly practice, and one which allowed the IFPs to 
fl ourish, was the under-investment in public sector foster care. With low allowances 
and fees as well as poor status and recognition from their local authorities, foster 
carers expressed increasing levels of dissatisfaction. Early studies (for example, 
Knapp and Fenyo, 1989) challenged government fi gures that suggested foster care 
cost almost eight times less than residential care. Commentators in the late 1980s 
estimated that foster carers were bearing considerable costs, as much as 50 per cent 
of their allowances, which were not forthcoming from their fostering agencies. At 
that time nearly all of these agencies were local authorities.
The current situation seems to have changed little. One working group chaired 
by the Directors of the Fostering Network and British Association of Adoption 
and Fostering (BAAF) assessed the amount of additional costs, alongside current 
levels of expenditure, necessary for fostering across the four countries of the UK 
(Tapsfi eld and Collier, 2005). It concluded that considerable increased investment 
is required to meet service developments related to foster carer fees, training, and 
general support and associated staff costs. In England for example, existing estimates 
of the weekly unit costs were £234 for local authority fostering services and £765 
for foster care services purchased from IFPs. This study proposed a sum of £633 
as necessary for ‘effective foster care services’ (Tapsfi eld and Collier, 2005, p.2) in 
England, thus pitching their estimate closer to the amount paid by IFPs.
The national survey of IFPs found that these agencies were paying foster carers 
around 50 per cent of the fees charged to local authorities and that as a result they 
had a potential income worth at least three times that of local authority foster carers 
(Sellick and Connolly, 2002). Little wonder then that reported levels of satisfaction 
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of IFP foster carers have endured and are signifi cantly higher than those of their 
local authority peers (Sellick, 1992, Kirton et al, 2003). The fees charged by IFPs 
to local authorities (and reinvested in high foster carer allowances) had begun to 
force the hands of local authorities or stolen a march on them. If councils would 
not invest directly in children through foster carer payments, then the IFPs 
ensured that they did so indirectly through the fees they charged. As a result local 
authorities were often ‘bumped’ into exceeding their budgets by paying unplanned 
IFP rates because of their own placement shortfall. One local authority manager in 
a recent commissioning study provided a sobering account of this situation when 
she said: 
I am spending £1.4 million on under 40 IFP placements and £3.2 million on the 
other 220 kids that we are looking after in house. The sums don’t add up and that is 
what we’re up against all the time (Sellick, 2005, p.12).
Ideology and enterprise
Two other phenomena have altered the map of fostering in Britain - a changing 
ideology within the public sector alongside a growing welfare entrepreneurialism 
outside it. When combined, these have become a signifi cant force shifting traditional 
ideas and practices. The hostility towards IFP provision and its staff and carers, 
expressed by local authority managers and budget holders, is found in the range of 
accusations made against the IFPs for poaching carers, charging golf course fees and 
of making a profi t opportunity out of children (Sellick and Connolly, 2002, Sellick 
and Howell, 2003). Similar sentiments have not however been expressed in the 
literature in respect of the non governmental adoption sector. The fi rst stage report 
of a contemporary adoption study of services supporting birth relatives and contact 
confi rms that voluntary adoption agencies (VAAs) are a mix of religious, charitable 
and not-for-profi t organisations co-operating with local authorities through the 
provision of complementary services (Sellick et al, 2006). This study found that 
many local authorities were quick to commission VAAs to provide birth relative 
support services. By comparison, IFPs were initially perceived as private and profi t-
seeking, predatory and competitive agencies with no tradition of supplementing 
public sector child welfare activities. This gulf in attitudes began to narrow. Social 
workers’ experiences of placing children with IFP foster carers and purchasing 
related services, largely positive government inspections of IFPs, research evidence 
and, as we shall see below, legal changes began to challenge these perceptions. As 
the National Survey showed, by 2001 IFPs were recruiting foster carers who had 
not, nor were likely, to foster for local authorities and were developing innovative 
services and providing specialist placements often unavailable elsewhere at the time 
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(Sellick and Connolly, 2002). These developments did seem to shift attitudes and 
practice towards the use of IFPs in many local authorities and, in some, managers 
began to view IFPs in much the same way as VAAs. They provided a service which 
was unavailable within the local authority and in so doing allowed those managers 
to discharge their duties.
The new founders and directors of IFPs, particularly in the face of considerable 
hostility from their former local authority colleagues, showed a willingness to take 
risks in setting up the IFPs. As the national survey discovered:
although the public sector directly underwrites the IFPs, most encountered set-up 
costs often involving personal investment and risk. There were examples of agencies 
being established by drawing on redundancy, retirement and inheritance lump sums 
as well as by business loans (Sellick and Connolly, 2002, p.108).
In order to develop new and improved services for children and young people, 
these welfare entrepreneurs blended a business approach with a desire to free 
themselves from what they saw as the mediocrity of public practice and provision. 
Those that succeeded were followed, as was evident in the national survey (Sellick 
and Connolly, 2002) and the review conducted by the Social Care Institute for 
Excellence (SCIE) (Sellick and Howell, 2004), by foster carers transferring from 
jobs as teachers, social workers, psychologists, youth workers and nurses.  These 
professionals wanted to go ‘back to basics’ by practising through foster caring, 
something they considered themselves trained to do, and to do so, on comparable 
or enhanced salaries.
A particular feature of the IFPs has been their willingness to offer themselves up to 
independent scrutiny. The early IFPs volunteered for (a largely positive) examination 
by the Social Services Inspectorate in 1995 (Department of Health, 1995) and the 
evaluation of the Midland Foster Care Associates (MFCA) in 1997/1998 (Sellick, 
1999, Sellick and Connolly, 1999) was probably the fi rst such commissioned scrutiny 
of an individual IFP. Many IFP directors believed they had little to hide and seemed 
secure in the knowledge:
that their ability to recruit and retain experienced foster carers, offer choices of 
placement for children and provide them with a range of inter-disciplinary services, 
especially related to schooling and therapy, [was] more than a match for most local 
authorities (Sellick, 1999, p.12).
Four years later this factor was confi rmed when the review commissioned by 
the Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE) found several examples of agencies 
which had commissioned independent organisations to evaluate their services. The 
authors of this review noted that ‘in a competitive market place a positive evaluation 
report is a very useful marketing tool’ (Sellick and Howell, 2004, p.496). Whatever 
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the motive, this opening up of the books was signifi cant in two major ways. Firstly, 
this process very clearly caught the policy mood of transparency and accountability 
and therefore on a strategic level was instrumental in obtaining investment for the 
IFPs. Secondly, these evaluations had the potential both of informing and improving 
practice and policy development in fostering agencies across the public as well as 
independent sectors.
A key to the success of the IFPs is that their directors and managers have been 
adept at placing themselves on both sides of the political divide. By the mid 1990s 
IFPs had grown rapidly from the dozen or so teenage placement agencies based in 
the south east of England in the late 1980s.  They were operating far more widely 
within a Conservative era which required more competition and less regulation 
within welfare service provision. The IFPs continued to expand after 1997 when early 
policy changes at the start of the New Labour age required Best Value (Department of 
Health, 2002a) approaches and later an equitable system of regulation and inspection 
between fostering agencies in the public and independent sectors. Many IFPs were 
poised, in the right place, at the right time, with the right people, and were therefore 
‘fi t for purpose’ in their ability to adapt to a different policy scene. In particular, 
the Government’s additional funding of the public sector was conditional upon the 
modernisation of local authority practice and services. In the absence or under-
development of alternative models, local authorities were often led to emulate those 
services which had been developed by IFPs. This increased funding, and the new 
public sector services it brought, did not neutralise those available from IFPs and 
certainly did not undermine the growth of further independent providers. Sellick 
(2002) estimated that there were almost as many IFPs as there were local authorities 
in England. By 2006 there were virtually twice as many IFPs than English local 
authorities (Sellick, 2006b).
Legal and policy changes: Opportunities and risks
The Care Standards Act 2000 brought the inspection of, and services provided by, 
all public and independent fostering agencies into line. These agencies were therefore 
registered and inspected in the same way: all were required to comply with the 
National Standards for Fostering Services and the Fostering Services Regulations, 
2002 (Cullen and Lane, 2006). In describing the Government’s cross-departmental 
review of provision for young children in 1998, one commentator referred to ‘a 
commitment to the belief that statutory and voluntary agencies working together with 
a common goal can achieve more than the sum of the individual parts’ (Glass, 1999, 
p.57) as an underlying principle of the new policy direction. Placement selection 
and related service provision were certainly key examples of this common goal. 
As the second New Labour term became the third in the mid-2000s, policy shifts 
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towards commissioning children’s services, including foster placements, within 
children’s trusts  (Department for Education and Skills, 2005b) consolidated the 
position of the IFPs as pathfi nders or pioneers of educational, therapeutic and other 
service innovations.
Another feature of this new statutory and policy framework only became apparent 
once the Care Standards Act had been implemented. Its immediate consequences 
have been signifi cant. The Act empowered all independent (in addition to local 
authority) fostering agencies to assess and approve foster carers. Previously only 
voluntary, not for profi t, agencies could be delegated these responsibilities by local 
authorities (Cullen, 2006). Probably because of this, at the time of the National 
Survey, 80 per cent of IFAs had registered under the previous arrangements as 
voluntary agencies. Information now available from the Commission for Social Care 
Inspection (CSCI) in England exposes a striking difference in the status of IFPs 
between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ agencies. In July 2006, 253 agencies were registered as 
IFPs in England. Thirty three were old IFPs including branches of Barnardos and the 
NCH and 28 of these had registered as voluntary, not for profi t, organisations. The 
majority 220 IFPs were new and of these 206 were registered as private, for profi t, 
organisations (CSCI, 2006). The implications are clear. There is now a substantial 
internal market of private sector fostering agencies in England competing with one 
another for local authority placement contracts.
On the face of it, the Care Standards Act was an exercise in equal opportunities. 
On the one hand it required all agencies to be accountable in the same way through 
regulation, inspection and registration and on the other empowered these agencies 
to assess and approve their own workforce of foster carers. Yet local authorities are 
usually large and under-funded organisations with extensive and wide-ranging 
responsibilities far beyond those of the generally smaller and specialist IFPs. The 
capability of many local authorities to speedily develop services and innovate is 
therefore curtailed in comparison to most IFPs. The entrepreneurialism which 
underpinned the growth and success of these agencies is unlikely to diminish. 
For many, possibly most, outsourcing contracts from local authorities promises 
a potentially lucrative income stream. The extent and volume of placements and 
related services Is likely to far exceed those currently available through service 
level agreements identifi ed in the SCIE review (Sellick and Howell, 2004) and 
commissioning study (Sellick, 2005).
Welfare reform and new managerialism
There is a growing literature in which a number of social policy commentators discuss 
how government reform and the practice of ‘new managerialism’ have changed 
the face of welfare in Britain. One edited account brings together assessments 
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of the welfare reforms of New Labour’s fi rst term of government (Powell, 2002). 
In one (Brunsdon and May, 2002) the authors distinguish between voluntary 
and community, and commercial welfare organisations in their evaluation of the 
government’s approach to independent welfare provision. One of these commentators 
writes elsewhere that ‘policy statements and planned initiatives from the current 
Labour administration suggest that private welfare is set to feature more prominently 
in the welfare mix of the future and in ways that are unlikely to be undermined by 
a government of a different political hue’ (Brunsdon, 2003, p.189). The increasing 
use of the non governmental sector and its commercial and community mix appear 
therefore to constitute a unifying and sustainable ideology within contemporary 
British politics.
Other writers have used social work as a case study to describe and explain the 
links between managerialism and the marketisation of welfare in the New Labour 
age. Harris (1998) traces the development of management models in social work in 
the UK from bureau professionalism in the late 1970s to ‘new managerialism’ in the 
1990s. Harlow (2004) explores the role of women in British social work within the 
dual world of post-feminism and new managerialism. Hodgson (2004) conducted a 
qualitative study to determine the nature of civil society in Wales and its association 
with the devolved Welsh Assembly. Heffernan (2006) considers the impact of 
language on social work practice in Britain especially how the term ‘service user’ 
rather than ‘client’ better refl ects the imperative for involvement and collaboration. 
All offer additional insights as we continue to make sense of contemporary, and to 
predict future, developments in foster care.
In an open welfare market non governmental agencies compete in the delivery 
of social work services. This means that alternative rather than supplementary 
services are developed and provided by private and independent welfare agencies 
with an imperative to raise standards and reduce costs. In order to do so, services 
have to be managed rather than simply administered, ‘in the most cost-effective 
and effi cient manner (where) management methods have been borrowed from the 
private sector’ (Harlow, 2004, p.169). Harris (1998) makes much the same point 
in his account of the application of the market to state sector social work which 
was seen as ‘ineffi cient, wasteful and unbusiness-like with a lack of concern for 
effi ciency and value for money’ (Harris, 1998, p.852). There was then a fi rm view 
that the public sector could be overhauled by private sector methods. Sellick (2006b) 
challenges this one dimensional view of private practice and uses a number of 
studies which scrutinised private and manufacturing company management and 
business techniques to show that key staff were engaged in activities which were 
more commonly associated with the public sector. The most recent publication of 
these social policy commentators includes the phrase ‘new public management’ to 
describe where we now appear to be in a welfare world of ‘working collaboratively 
across traditional service boundaries’ (Heffernan, 2006, p.142). This seems to fi t 
well with both the implementation of children’s trusts and the kinds of contracting 
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arrangements identifi ed in the commissioning study (Sellick, 2005, 2006b). 
However, Hodgson’s account of partnerships between the state, civil society and 
business anticipates an alternative situation in which, apart from its funding role, 
the state plays no part in service provision ‘where the institutions of civil society, in 
the form of a mix of voluntary associations and the market, form the proper forum 
for providing welfare’ (Hodgson, 2004, p.140).
At the crossroads
So, is this the choice which is emerging for future practice: between a model 
where local authorities and IFPs, both old and new, collaborate in the shared 
provision of foster care, or one where the public sector withdraws and simply 
outsources placement and other service provision from mostly private independent 
fostering providers? Either way, the place of public sector provision has shifted 
considerably over the past decade. Although, as some of the research witnesses in 
the commissioning study (Sellick, 2005) made clear, the practice of purchasing and 
providing foster care services is met with mixed views by those engaged in this. 
There remain strong, opposing opinions about the practice of the mixed economy of 
fostering and these seem to have two main platforms. The fi rst supports those who 
object to the use of the public purse for private provision. For example, one local 
authority social worker in the MFCA evaluation commented that the priority of this 
agency ‘was to attract money rather than the good of the child’ (Sellick and Connolly, 
1999, p.20). Such views endure as illustrated by a local authority manager in the 
commissioning study  (Sellick, 2005) who six year later said her ‘concentration is 
on developing our business’ (Sellick, 2005, p.9) rather than in collaborating with a 
local IFP. However, these expressions were in the minority. The majority of workers 
and managers across sectors seemed to share the experiences of Swedish social 
workers and students who found that ‘the impact of ideology seems to diminish’ 
(Dellgran and Hojer, 2005, p.57) with the provision of social work and fostering 
services which they valued and respected. The second platform supports those who 
apply what they consider to be effective business-like approaches emerging from 
the previous political era of compulsory competitive tendering. These managers, 
and they are found in IFPs as well as local authorities, want to do business in the 
purchase and provision of services as they imagine goods are handled in private 
and manufacturing companies. The many examples of socio-legal studies which 
informed the second of the commissioning publications (Sellick, 2006b) challenge 
this interpretation of doing business.
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The Future
Two paths appear to be emerging. In one, which has already been staked out, 
fostering is being delivered through collaborative arrangements between local 
authorities and IFPs. These were not always entered into willingly, or voluntarily 
with good grace and in many local authorities considerable fi nancial problems 
remain. However, these have become an established feature of the fostering scene. 
Councils are maintaining a public service in which they approve foster carers, place 
children and support placements according to their own local capacity. Where this 
is exceeded, as it generally is, IFPs are commissioned to make up the shortfall in 
foster placements and related services. Practice varies, but that is the route which is 
being followed across the country. A second path is at a later stage of construction. 
At its core is an internal market of largely private, for profi t, IFPs accountable to 
shareholders rather than trustees, competing to provide placements purchased by 
local authorities. Some IFPs are able to supply considerably more placements and 
services than at present. Indeed many, buoyed up by the success of their enterprise, 
are keen to follow this other path. A recently published government commissioned 
study conducted by a large private sector fi nancial company argues strongly (and 
virtually uncritically) for this alternative path (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006). 
In this scene more and more, and eventually most or all, foster placements will be 
provided by IFPs.
The success of IFPs to position themselves skilfully and strategically according to 
differing policy imperatives seems unlikely to diminish. No policy maker or manager 
is likely to disregard the outputs of IFPs in respect of placement provision, services for 
children and foster carer support and satisfaction. There are other developments also: 
for example, the recruitment and retention of particular profi les of foster carers such 
as actively engaged male carers, and those with relevant professional qualifi cations 
and experience, which have resulted from IFP innovation and investment over the 
past decade (Sellick and Howell, 2003, 2004). A weakening or dismissal of ideology 
in welfare, shared it seems by policy makers and practitioners alike, may well 
infl uence the views and actions of the other key players - the managers, directors 
and budget holders in both public and independent agencies. Some may share the 
approach of the local authority manager who thought ‘there might be a future where 
the independent provider can exist without being a threat to the local authority’ 
(Sellick, 2005, p.15). Others, including those who are sympathetic with the view 
that the public sector should move further to the market place, may prefer a future 
where the existence of local authority fostering agencies is increasingly replaced 
by an enhanced private child welfare sector. A steady loss of faith in the ability of 
the public sector to do a good job and a weakening ideological opposition to free 
markets are likely to strengthen the IFPs. Independent agencies may well consolidate 
their position as the providers of more and more fostering placements and related 
services whilst local authorities provide less and commission more.
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Outsourcing is likely to suit some large IFPs which have the capacity to provide a 
substantial volume of placements to local authorities. The PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
report identifi ed fi ve large IFPs with multi-million pound annual turnovers and 
many hundreds (in one case 1,500) of foster carers (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2006, p.25). However, for other IFPs, both new and old, the perils identifi ed in the 
American and Australian studies (Barber, 2002; Unruh and Hodgkin, 2004) may 
await successful bidders of outsourced contracts. They may have under-estimated 
their costs in order to undercut their competitors. In so doing, they may have to 
reduce their services to children and foster carers. Doing the former may jeopardise 
their ability to recapture contracts when these are reviewed and doing the latter may 
risk undermining foster carer satisfaction and retention. A former Director of BAAF 
in Scotland sets out the dangers which voluntary providers have already faced: 
... while the larger agencies within the sector, such as Barnardos and NCH, have the 
strength, fi nancial power and wisdom to retain adequate space for innovative projects, 
smaller agencies are becoming increasingly preoccupied with meeting their contract 
specifi cations, with little room for manoeuvre. For these agencies, the barriers to entry 
into the welfare market have been removed, but the option of exit from the market 
has also been removed from their control. The result may be stifl ed growth and lack 
of innovation (Giltinan, 2002, p.55).
Outsourcing would allow councils to predict and reduce costs by budgeting 
for large volume based contracts with IFPs. However, beyond the short-term, 
outsourcing is unlikely to suit local authorities. In the medium and longer terms, 
fi nancial and supply diffi culties may mean that IFPs are unable to deliver the same 
quality and quantity of services. Outsourcing may simply therefore transfer rather 
than solve public sector funding problems. Relying on a competitive market place 
where other IFPs can tender more favourably than those struggling to deliver on 
the terms of the original contracts will create additional diffi culties. Perhaps the 
greatest of these for local authorities would be the instability and disruption for 
looked after children being transferred from the foster carers of one IFP to another. 
In other words, exactly the same problems that New Labour policy initiatives such 
as Quality Protects, Best Value, and Choice Protects (Department of Health, 1998, 
2002a, Department for Education and Skills, 2005c) were designed to solve.
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Conclusion
The provision of foster care in Britain has changed signifi cantly during the last decade 
although there are some certainties. Fostering is no longer a public sector activity 
occasionally supplemented by specialist schemes in long-established voluntary child 
care organisations. The combination of an undersupply of local authority foster carers, 
and the heavy demand in terms of both volume and needs of the children and young 
people placed, has ended that virtual monopoly position. The non governmental 
sector’s role in providing foster placements and related therapeutic and educational 
services has grown signifi cantly, some would say spectacularly, in the past decade. 
There is no evidence that the mixed economy of foster care provision will improve 
outcomes for children and young people. Although the range of services for children 
and young people placed in the IFPs has been valued by their agency foster carers, 
and the placing local authority social workers, there is virtually no evidence that 
these services are more successful or that they provide added value, beyond those 
available within local authorities, or that any such benefi t is long-lasting. As Sellick 
and Connolly say: ‘We know that IFA foster carers rate their support services very 
highly but we do not know whether these make a difference to children’ (Sellick 
and Connolly, 2002, p.119).
For much of the time most of the non-governmental foster care sector comprised 
voluntary, not for profi t agencies, staffed and managed by former local authority 
social workers. Their identity as innovators and pioneers of services for children and 
support for foster carers placed them in the tradition of the established voluntary 
sector.  It also led to high levels of expressed satisfaction by the carers attached to 
these agencies and the social workers commissioning their services. That status 
has clearly changed. Currently, non governmental fostering agencies are almost 
exclusively registered as private organisations. Legal changes introduced by the 
Care Standards Act have enabled this to happen, but ideological changes, shared it 
seems by many of the key players, have cemented this development. Many welcome 
it as a sign of enterprise, and wish to support and defend this new position. The 
consequences are less certain. Researchers and practitioners in Kansas and South 
Australia (and some distinguished commentators in this country) have strongly 
cautioned against the drive towards a free foster care market characterised by open 
and competitive tenders for outsourced contacts (Barber, 2002; Unruh and Hodgkin, 
2004; Gittings, 2002). But even if their voices have been heard by those who have the 
power to slow down or temper this drive, the possibilities of fewer supply diffi culties 
for local authorities and greater demand certainties for IFPs may be too tempting 
to resist. This is particularly so if these are driven by a political consensus that the 
market can invigorate a moribund public sector and constrain costs. This position 
does not necessarily preclude the kinds of collaborative working relationships which 
have accompanied this new world of inter-sector arrangements, especially if welfare 
mangers understand that some of their private and manufacturing sector peers have 
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learnt to value and apply these kind of arrangements and relationships. Contracting 
through co-operation and collaboration may well become the exemplar, even in a 
more business-minded private welfare sector.
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